in China's rural areas successfully stimulated the productivity in its agricultural sector. The reform of SOEs began in 1984: in the initial phase, decision rights were decentralized to lower levels of governments and SOE managers through the "profi t retention mechanism" and the "production responsibility system." The second stage of the economic reform was characterized by the implementation of the "management responsibility contract system" (MRCS) in 1987. Under this system, the government transferred management authority to enterprises and allowed them to retain some of their profi ts.
However, the fi rst two stages of the reform were still implemented within the framework of traditional state socialism without making any signifi cant changes to the existing ownership structure (Guo, 2003) , in which case the state was still ultimately responsible for the loss of SOEs. Various studies show that these reforms improved the productivity of SOEs. For example, Groves et al. (1994) provide empirical evidence that the MRCS improved productivity of SOEs and increased the workers' compensation. On the other hand, they also fi nd that the government subsidies to the SOEs were not reduced, nor were the profi ts of SOEs increased. This refl ects a general problem of SOEs' rising productivity but falling profi tability (see Table 5 .1), and implies that the state, as the owner, could not gain from the improved productivity in SOEs. This confl icting result about Chinese SOEs' productivity and profi tability may be understood if we take a closer look at SOEs' operation. Qian (1996) suggests that SOE managers used their effective control over the assets of SOEs to benefi t themselves at the expense of the state in many cases. For instance, SOE managers borrowed money from state-owned banks, but some of the loans were not channeled into production; rather, they were channeled into their compensation. In the extreme form, the managers stole money and assets from enterprises. Indeed, the socalled "state asset stripping" problem increased at an alarming rate during that period. In a study conducted by Kernen (1997) , for example, some SOE managers admitted that they had created a number of collective or private enterprises for their relatives using SOEs' assets. These kinds of misconduct behavior undoubtedly hurt the state's interest. Being also 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Return on fi xed assets (%) 10.23 10.25 10.14 7.31 3.34 2.97 3.41
Source: compiled by the authors using fi gures from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (various years).
